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Space of Reasons and Mathematical Model
Logical Understanding III
Florian Richter
Abstract
Inferential relations govern our concept use. In order to understand
a concept it has to be located in a “space of implications” (Wilfrid Sell-
ars). There are different kinds of conditions for statements, i.e. that the
conditions represent different kinds of explanations, e.g. causal or concep-
tual explanations. The crucial questions is: How can the conditionality
of language use be represented. The conceptual background of represen-
tation in models is discussed and in the end I propose how implications
of propositional logic and conceptual determinations can be represented
in a model of a neural network.
1 Introduction
1.1 Context – Commitments
In the last paper it was shown that conceptual relations exist within a space of
implications. This means that statements are embedded in a logical space of
conditions. There are different kinds of conditions for statements: they can rep-
resent reasons, conceptual relations, causes, or also motivational states, which
explain actions. Inferring from the statements to its conditions is part of ab-
ductive reasoning. Charles Sanders Peirce is very honest about his own mistake
of confusing inductive reasoning and abductive reasoning (hypothesis): “Only
in almost everything I printed before the beginning of this century I more or
less mixed up Hypothesis and Induction...”[12] (CP 8.227) This mix up is very
common.
1.2 Problem
Abductive inferences are also often forgotten in the context of reasoning. Be-
hind the confusion of induction and abduction lies the problematic point of
mathematical representation of reasoning. Induction is easier to represent and
can be based on statistical tools. Markov logic e.g. is a combination of statistics
and predicate logic. Universal formulas, e.g. “All M are K.” (∀x(xM → xK)),
can represent rules or conceptual relations (characteristics). But what happens
if we encounter a counterexample? Only one counterexample makes them false,
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but if they are taken as weighted, valid, statistical regularities, this problem
might be bypassed. Therefore, if a (possible) world violates one formula, then
the probability of the formula of being true goes down. If there are only few
worlds violated, the formula (statement) might probably be true. The worlds
are constraints on the universally quantified formulas: “A first-order KB can
be seen as a set of hard constraints on the set of possible worlds: if a world
violates even one formula, it has zero probability.” Domingos et al. (2016) state
that the “basic idea in Markov logic is to soften these constraints: when a world
violates one formula in the KB it is less probable, but not impossible. The fewer
formulas a world violates, the more probable it is. Each formula has an asso-
ciated weight that reflects how strong a constraint it is: the higher the weight,
the greater the difference in log probability between a world that satisfies the
formula and one that does not, other things being equal.”[2]
The crucial question is here, how the similarities or differences are calculated
and with regard to which concept or idea. This is a question from abductive
reasoning. E.g. a plastic tree can be in size and form similar to a real oak
tree and is therefore with regard to size and form more similar than a bonsai
tree, but with regard to the material the bonsai tree is more similar to an oak
tree. Abductive reasoning is conceptually richer and can be found often in the
field of engineering and in philosophy of technology. The following table is from
Christoph Hubig[7] (208):
Perceptual abduction Conceptual abduction
(middle term)
Inference on the
case
object of perception characteristics as relevant
for building a class
Inference on the
rule
rule of perception class/intension of the
concept
Inference on the
best explanation
explanation of perception conceptual rule of
subsumption
Inference on the
best strategy of
explanation
strategy of perception system of classification
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Causal abduction Presuppositional
abduction
Inference on the
case
cause means, instrument as
reliable/proven
Inference on the
rule
lawlike connections techniques as yielding
results
Inference on the
best explanation
theories sciences, technologies
Inference on the
best strategy of
explanation
paradigms, patterns of
interpretation
general principle of
relation to the world,
conception of technology
How can these different kinds of inferences be represented in mathematical mod-
els? One example will be picked out to shape the kind of mathematical thinking
behind causal reasoning.
2 Causal Reasoning – Explanations
In statistics one tries to identify the confounder not as a condition that messes
up the data. The confounder is therefore not the real cause. The real cause has
to be revealed in order to make the data “meaningful”.[11] According to Judea
Pearl, statistics lacks the idea of causality and statisticians are only interested
in correlation. That is a strong statement that might not be applicable for
every statistician. Pearl writes that “[d]ata are the ingredients that go into the
estimand recipe. It is critical to realize that data are profoundly dumb about
causal relationships. They tell us about quantities like P(L | D) or P(L | D, Z).
It is the job of the estimand to tell us how to bake these statistical quantities
into one expression that, based on the model assumptions, is logically equivalent
to the causal query – say, P(L | do(D)).” According to him the “whole notion of
estimands does not exist in traditional methods of statistical analysis. There,
the estimand and the query coincide.” Now, if we e.g. would be “interested in
the proportion of people among those with Lifespan L who took the Drug D, we
simply write this query as P(D | L). The same quantity would be our estimand.”
This should require “no causal knowledge. For this reason, some statisticians to
this day find it extremely hard to understand why some knowledge lies outside
the province of statistics and why data alone cannot make up for lack of scientific
knowledge.”[11] (14/15)
The role of this scientific knowledge has to be explained. Pearl thinks of a
“ladder of causation” that leads from “correlation” (pure statistics) to “inverven-
tion”, which means to do to something and therefore to intervene in the chain of
events, and the highest point is represented by “counterfactuals” that depict the
intervention and are based on causal models about the world.[11] (17) Statisti-
cally, events or data “only” correlate, but they need to be seen through “causal
models”, which are established through interventions, and serve to obtain causal
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knowledge, that predicts effects. This is shall be done by the “algorithmization
of counterfactuals”.[11] (9)
Pearl talks about structural models that have causal assumptions about the
world. Also, in physics they are using models to represent the world, but do
they use causal models, as a layperson might assume. Max Planck sees that the
physical world view with its determined systems is a model and as a model it is
an idealization, because normally there are measurement errors that could lead
to (slightly) different results than what the model might predict. Measuring
the quantities that are represented in the equations yields not always “exact”
results. The physical model of the world is at least not affected by inexact
measurements.[15] – Well, the role of quantum mechanics as an indetermined
physical model has to be left out here.
What role does causality play in physics? And how do we usually use the
term? We seem to know it from our everyday talk, when we say things like:
“Peter came late, because of the heavy traffic.” So, the heavy traffic is the
cause. We use causal connections to explain the behavior of persons or also the
behavior of objects. Causality is a concept that is often used in philosophy, but
not really in physics, even though we would expect that it plays a prominent role
there.[15] We could e.g. say that a force or an event is the cause of a movement
or of another event. Strangely, physicists do not use causality in that way. There
is a difference according to Erhard Scheibe between the causality of states that
are determined clearly and an irreversible causality of events. David Hume and
Immanuel Kant examine the irreversible form of causality of events, that has
at its core the assymetry of the earlier and later. But already Isaac Newton
and then Heinrich Hertz see the equations as the essence of the necessary link
between states. The system is determined and can therefore be exhibited by
the formation of equations which depict or represent quantities. The system is
made calculable by quantification. If something is messing up the system – a
confounder – it is seen as the cause that leads to a certain effect, but the cause
is yet not integrated into the system to represent clearly its determination by
an equation. The determination of the system by an equation is made clearer,
when more an more confounders, which might have an influence on the system,
are integrated in order to sustain its calculability and thus its predictability or
can be disregarded as irrelevant.[15]
Models are internally determined and they are represented by inferential
and differential relations[9], like the equations represent determined models.
Usually, we use causality as an explanation for the behavior of persons (we
produce something and are the cause or the producer of the cause (see the
intervention part in Pearl)) and we use causality as an explanation in an analog
manner to explain the behavior of objects, like the movements of the planets[9],
but explanations in physics do not use the concept causality. Their models try
to get rid of confounders or defeasors in order to have a “consistent” model.
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3 Limits of Models as Means of Representation
In the debates in the philosophy of science, according to Hubig, the modeling of
dispositional predicates in if-then-clauses, like the implication fails, because the
implication would be true, if the antecendent is not realized or not realizable
(“under-determination”) or have to be discarded, if the consequent has not been
realized under the conditions of the antecendet (“over-determination”). Within
these debates the approaches in the philosophy of science change to counter-
factual conditionals as means of representation and search for prognostic or
indicative sentences, which are equivalent to them. To avoid that the prog-
nostic or indicative sentences turn to be counterintuitive, pragmatic conditions
of the antecedent have to be added, which correspond to “conceptions of nor-
mality”. In this way, the validity of prognostic and indicative sentences can be
guaranteed or warranted.[8]
Such conceptions of standardized cases cannot be represented by a complete
list of conditions in the form of explicit rules. If that would be possible, then
a set of premises, which would represent a complete list of the circumstances
or conditions (Σ) as well as a rule as the major premise (Φ), would always
lead to an instantiation of the rule (ϕ) – this is a kind of deductive reasoning
(Σ,Φ⇒ ϕ).1[9] (213)
Hubig points out that we can not describe “complete states of the world”[8]
(here Σ), but it is at least possible to describe a set of “potential defeasors”[1]
(107)2 – also conditions of the antecedent, but the ones that should be avoided
– like Robert Brandom writes, who, independently of Hubig, with reference to
his ideas about “material inference”, sheds light on this issue. He states that the
material inferences are “in general non-monotonic”.[1] (106) For him, that does
not mean that the “potential defeasors” should be made explicit in a complete
list. The task is therefore not to transform such inferences in monotonic ones.[1]
(107)3 “The potential defeasors in this way associated with each material infe-
rence endorsed in turn define (by complementation) the range of counterfactual
robustness practically associated with that inference.”[1] (108)
That is why the “counterfactual robustness” and the “potential defeasors”
are necessary in order to understand the “conceptual content of sentences” or:
“counterfactually robust inferences are an essential aspect of the articulation of
the conceptual contents of sentences”.[1] (125) Brandom concludes from this,
“that in view of the non-monotonicity of material inference, the practical task
of updating the rest of one´s beliefs when some of them change is tractable in
principle only if those who deploy a vocabulary practically discriminate ranges of
1The greek letters represent names in the metalanguage.
2It is worth to mention that “the potential defeasors are not limited to sentences that are
true”, because a “non-actual state of affairs is possible”. (125)
3“And no one supposes that such probative reasoning can always be turned into dispositive
reasoning by making an explicit, exhaustive list of the potential defeasors.” Or: “There need
be no definite totality of possible defeasors, specifiable in advance. Even where we have some
idea how to enumerate them, unless those provisos are generally left implicit, actually stating
the premises so as to draw inferences from them monotonically is impossibly cumbersome in
practice.”
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counterfactual robustness for many of the material inferences they endorse.”[1]
(109)
Within such a framework it is not necessary to establish a set of circum-
stances or conditions, which (1.) describe a ‘complete’ state of the world and
that is why it is not necessary to allow (2.) in a formal way an ‘infinite’ list of
possible monotonic premises. One would either take the position of an absolute-
deterministic or a formal and abstract standpoint of an empty metalanguage.
From the first standpoint there would be the requirement, that there are no
possible conditions that could serve as defeasors, which have to be subtracted
or incorporated in order to assure the result of the inference. This would mean
that all conditions are explicit. The last standpoint would allow to add every
true premise like in a formal and monotonic logic. – Another way to assure the
result of the consquence, the application or instantiation of the rule, would be
to introduce a meta-rule, which settles the application, but that would lead to
an infinite regress.
4 Models – Representational Tools
Theories use models in order to represent structures. The models encompass an
object-language that is normally weaker in its expressive power than the meta-
language4, because the metalanguage is would here be the natural language, in
which we talk about the models and their structures. The models are not able
to do that, because they have no representation of themselves.
Hubig and Michael Weingarten introduce an important distinction in the
philosophy of science.[6, 16] Is something a model of or a model for something?
The “models of...” are external “realizations, instantiations, exemplifications”.
The structure (S) of the realization (R) is revealed via induction or abduction.
If R fulfills every rule of the formulas (F) of S. At least, this is possible in a
axiomatic system.[6] (35) The “models for...” are “paradigmatic abstractions,
i.e. one-sided pictures of structures”. Hubig calls them “conceptualized models”
or a “model-idealism”. The only thing that counts is the “correctness of the use
of the symbols”.[7]
For example, a camera can be a model of the eye. The camera is a techni-
cal device that allows to explain the function of the eye. There is a symmetry
assumed between the technical model (device) and the realization or instantia-
tion of the model (eye). The model and the representation in the model (eye)
belong as instantiations to the same class of natural laws. The function of both
(camera and eye) falls under the class of the laws of optics.[16] – It is often not
seen anymore that the technical device is used as a model, because we are so
accustomed to their use in our daily life, but also in the sciences.[16]
The presupposed symmetry allows to establish an equivalence, but this is
done on the level of the metalanguage, but for that it has to be clear that
we are using a model to represent something else as something, e.g. the mind
4It might be also the other way around: e.g. an “extensional metalanguage for intensional
languages” (“possible world semantics for modality”).[1] (11)
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as a computer or a logical machine. Computation and computability are also
certain aspects of human reasoning and were developed as a model of human
reasoning. – Neural processes construct the reality and semantic significance.
The starting point would be the neural organization of us and the emergence of
mind and meaning out of it, but the supposed relation of equivalence is empty
as long as the differences are not reflected. This happens when e.g. a technical
device is used to form a model of something else without reflecting that it is
a model, i.e. a tool to represent something. If we use the model for a certain
purpose, the assumed symmetry has to prove itself in the world/reality. The
model is then the means to accomplish the purpose and has to yield a certain
effect.[7] In neural networks the neurons are adjusted through backpropagation
in order to bring the ouput closer to the desired output. One model for machine
learning is the brain and it is therefore the means that is slotted in between the
output and the desired ouput. It is a real possibility – the medium, in which
the adjustments are done – and not just a formal possibility of manipulating
symbols, because the specific adjustments are represented by the ouput. It is a
representation via the model.
5 Representations of the Mind: Neural Networks
5.1 The Idea of Neural Networks
The idea is not to rebuild the human brain, but to use a model of it for machine
learning. How are the neurons connected and how do they make connections?
Neural networks are one-sided, paradigmatic pictures of the functioning of the
brain. They are of course models of the brain, but are taken here as models for
machine learning. Every neuron (approximately 100 billion in one human brain)
has an axon and is via dendrites connected with other neurons. If a certain
voltage exceeds a threshold the neuron fires.[4] (9.1) How the brain works and
how neurons work is still a big task for researchers with many unsolved riddles.
The model is, as said before, just a paradigmatic picture.
Warren McCulloch andWalter Pitts proposed in 1943 a model of a neuron.[10]
They propose an equivalence between the functioning of the neurons of the brain
and propositional logic (which can be also represented by logic gates in com-
puters). McCulloch and Pitts claim that “neither of us conceives the formal
equivalence to be a factual explanation”. The physical behaviors of the neurons
“in no way affect the conclusions which follow from the formal treatment of
the activity of nervous nets”, i.e. the behavior of the neurons does not affect
the formal connections of propositional logic represented by the logical opera-
tors. Propositional logic is the normative structure, which underlies the physical
activity.[10] (101) The determination of the states of the nervous net is based
on necessary connections, which are irreciprocal (causality5). There cannot be
a complete knowledge (or determination), because of the incompleteness as to
5Causality is here conceived similar to the notion of determination (which is described
above), because a certain kind of consistency of the system is required.
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space and indefiniteness as to time, and the “inclusion of disjunctive relations
prevents complete determination” on the logical side.[10] (113) Such a causal
determination is equivalent to the logic of propositions and disjunctions can be
added to determine the system step by step. – Even though they are concerned
with the logical determination, the notion of disjunctive relations is based on the
calculus of propositional logic and something else than conceptual determination
(see below).
5.2 Perceptron
Frank Rosenblatt introduced then in 1958 the idea of a perceptron. The model
is formulated “in terms of probability theory rather than symbolic logic.” The
activations of the neurons are calculated via the “algebraic sum of excitatory and
inhibitory impulse intensities”, which are “equal to or greater than the threshold
(θ)”.[13] (387-389) Perceptrons faced also several problems and in “1969, Minsky
and his colleague Seymour Papert published Perceptrons, a book detailing the
shortcomings of the eponymous algorithm, with example after example of simple
things it couldn´t learn.” [3] (100) A learning algorithm is judged by its ability to
learn and if there are basic things, that it can not do, it needs to be disregarded
or improved, but the question is not only about learning, also about the ability
to represent things. The problematic issue, that Pedro Domingos points out, is
more about the expressive richness of the representational model. And in the
case of the perceptron it cannot represent the “exclusive-OR function”[3] (100),
but a mulitlayer network can do it.
5.3 Hopfield-Model
John Hopfield, a physicist, suggested in 1982 an equivalence between neural nets
and a physical system of magnetism (spin glasses). Hopfield writes:
“There are classes of physical systems whose spontaneous behavior
can be used as a form of general (and error-correcting) content-
addressable memory. Consider the time evolution of a physical sys-
tem that can be described by a set of general coordinates. A point
in state space then represents the instantaneous condition of the sys-
tem. This state space may be either continuous or discrete (as in
the case of N Ising spins).
The equations of motion of the system describe a flow in state space.
Various classes of flow patterns are possible, but the systems of use
for memory particularly include those that flow toward locally stable
points from anywhere within regions around those points. A particle
with frictional damping moving in a potential well with two minima
exemplifies such a dynamics.”[5] (2554)
Wolfgang Ertel states that in the cases of pattern recognition, which are learned
by the Hopfield-model and are trained by certain examples with a certain
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amount of neurons, the states are finite. Like in the physical system the energy
function will reach a minimum, but if there are to many patterns learned, it
can lead to a chaotic dynamic and the system or neural network is not able
to recognize the patterns. In the model of Hopfield the neurons can learn to
recognize patterns, but only if there are enough neurons in the model, other-
wise it changes from an ordered dynamic to a chaotic dynamic.[4] (9.2) Another
problematic point is that the states in the model of Hopfield are binary. He uses
a step function6, while the activation of the neuron is now mostly calulated via
the sigmoid function to propagate through the neural network.
5.4 Forward Propagation and Backpropagation
Backpropagating is a learning procedure for neural networks.[14] It means to go
back layer by layer and to adjust the weights, but first you need to propagate
through the neural network. The calculation of the output or hypothesis is the
sum of the weights:
hθ(x) = σ (
∑n
i=1 θjixi)
θji is the weight or parameter that connects a neuron of the layer i to a neuron
on another layer j. The activation of the neuron is calculated via the sigmoid
function:
σ(x) = 11+e−x
And if there is now a difference between the desired output and the real output,
a learning algorithm propagates back. The loss function (sometimes also called
cost function) is used to adjust the weights to minimize the difference between
the actual output vector and the desired output vector.[14] (533)7
6 Neural Networks: Intuition
The goal is to build a neural network that is able to represent the logical impli-
cation of propositional logic. The compatibilities and incompatibilities can be
expressed in the following way.
p→ q is incompatible with ♦(p ∧ ¬q)
p→ q is compatible with ♦(¬p ∨ q)
6“A study of emergent collective effects and spontaneous computation must necessarily
focus on the nonlinearity of the input-output relationship. The essence of computation is
nonlinear logical operations. The particle interactions that produce true collective effects in
particle dynamics come from a nonlinear dependence of forces on positions of the particles.
[...] Those neurons whose operation is dominantly linear merely provide a pathway of com-
munication between nonlinear neurons. Thus, we consider a network of ‘on or off’ neurons,
granting that some of the interconnections may be by way of neurons operating in the linear
regime.”[5] (2555)
7For the backpropagation algorithm see Rumelhart et al. (1986)[14] or a textbook like
Ertel (2017).[4] (9.3.1)
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It is therefore possible to use the negation and the disjunction to build a neural
network that has as its output the same truth values like the implication in
propositional logic:
p q p→ q
t t t
t f f
f t t
f f t
The inputs are x1 and x2 (above p and q). The second layer contains a
[2]
1
and a
[2]
2 . And hΘ(x) is the output of the function, which is computed by the
variables and the parameters or weights (θ1, θ2, ...; as a matrix: Θ). For this
activation function the sigmoid function is used: σ(x) = 11+e−x and a bias unit
has to be added b. The function is thus:
hθ(x) = σ(b + θ1x1 + θ2x2)
To compute the negation:
hθ(x) = σ(5 − 10x1 + 0x2)
To compute the second layer a
[2]
2 , which should have the same value as x2:
hθ(x) = σ(−10 + 0x1 + 20x2)
To compute the disjunction of the second layer neurons:
hθ(a) = σ(−5 + 10a
[2]
1 + 10a
[2]
2 )
The truth values that are calculated with the sigmoid function are approxima-
tions to 1 and 0. The calculation of the activation of the neurons has the same
truth values like the implication in propositional logic:
x1 x2 a
[2]
1 a
[2[
2 hθ(x)
1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
Incompatibility of an implication (♦(p ∧ ¬q)) can be represented in a similar
way. The neural networks represent possible connections or states of conceptual
relations and if the input or the information changes the parameters can be
adjusted.
It was mentioned that McCulloch and Pitts introduce the notion of the “in-
clusion of disjunctive relations”, which “prevents complete determination” of the
states of the neurophysiological and logical model.[10] (113) I propose the intro-
duction of conjunctions that should be included in order to have a conceptual
determination. The conjunctions can be added as inputs and connected with
the second layer (a
[2]
2 ). They are possible determinations:
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¬p ∨ ♦(q ∧ r)
Or:
p→ ♦(q ∧ ¬r)
These conceptual relations remain, even if p is not the case. The proposed model
can represent implications and determines conceptually.
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